Abstract. Main purpose of this paper is to combine the optimal form of Fan's best approximation theorem and Nash's equilibrium existence theorem into a single existence theorem simultaneously. For this, we first prove a general best proximity pair theorem which includes a number of known best proximity theorems. Next, we will introduce a new equilibrium concept for a generalized Nash game with normal form, and as applications, we will prove new existence theorems of Nash equilibrium pairs for generalized Nash games with normal form.
Introduction
In 1969, Fan proved the well-known best approximation theorem which generalizes the Tychonoff fixed point theorem as follows:
Theorem A ([8]). If K is a non-empty compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space E with a continuous seminorm p, and f : K → E is a single valued continuous function, then there exists an elementx ∈ K such that
Since then, a number of generalizations of this theorem have been obtained in various directions by several authors (e.g., see [2, 3, 5, 13, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] ). Indeed, Reich [18] has shown that even if K is a non-empty approximately p-compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space E with a relatively compact image f (K), then the same conclusion holds. Later, Segal and Singh [21] have extended this result to convex valued continuous multifunctions. Even though a best approximation theorem guarantees the existence of an approximate solution, it is contemplated to find an approximate solution which is optimal. In this direction, Srinivasan and Veeramani [23] have proved the general forms of existence theorems for best proximity pairs, and Kim and Lee [12] prove two general existence theorems of best proximity pairs in a recent paper.
On the other hand, in 1951, Nash established the pioneering result on the existence of equilibrium for generalized games as follows:
Theorem B ( [15] ). Let I be a finite set of players. Assume that for all i ∈ I, (a) the set X i ⊂ R k i is non-empty compact and convex; (b) the function f i : X := Π i∈I X i → R is continuous on X; (c) the function y i → f i (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y i , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) is concave on X i . Then there exists a Nash equilibriumx = (x i ) i∈I ∈ X such that for each i ∈ I, f i (x 1 , . . . ,x i , . . . ,x n ) ≥ f i (x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . ,x n ) for all x i ∈ X i .
Next, in 1977, Friedman [9] established a generalization of Theorem B using the quasi-concavity assumption on every payoff function. Since then, the classical results of Nash [14, 15] , Debreu [4] and Friedman [9] have served as basic references for the existence of Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative generalized games. In all of them, convexity of strategy spaces, continuity and concavity/quasi-concavity of the payoff functions were assumed. Till now, there have been a number of generalizations, and also many applications of those theorems have been found in several areas, e.g., see [1, 9] and references therein.
In this paper, we will combine the optimal form of Theorem A and Theorem B into a single existence theorem simultaneously. For this purpose, we first prove a general best proximity pair theorem which generalizes the theorems due to Srinivasan and Veeramani [23, 24] , Kim and Lee [12] , and others. Next, we will introduce a new concept of Nash equilibrium pair in a generalized Nash game with normal form, and as applications of the best proximity pair theorem, we will prove new existence theorems of Nash equilibrium pairs for generalized Nash games with normal form which includes Theorem B and its generalizations due to Nikaido and Isoda [16] , Kim and Lee [11] , and others.
Preliminaries
We begin with some notations and definitions. Let I be any (possibly infinite) index set. For each i ∈ I, let X i be a non-empty topological space and denote Xî := Π j∈I\{i} X j , and
and if x i ∈ X i and xî ∈ Xî, we shall use the notation x := (
Let I be a finite (or an infinite) index set. For each i ∈ I, let X i and Y i be non-empty subsets of a normed linear space E with a norm || · ||, and the metric d(x, y) for E is induced by the norm, i.e., d(x, y) = ||x − y||. Then we can use the following notations as in [12, 24] : 
And we denote
is non-empty compact and convex but X o i is an empty set. For each i ∈ I, let X i and Y i be two non-empty subsets of a normed linear space E, and let
Then the best proximity pair theorem seeks an appropriate solutionx ∈ X which is optimal. In fact, the best proximity pair theorem analyzes the conditions which the problem of minimizing the realvalued function x → d(x i , T i (x)) has a simultaneous solution for each i ∈ I. In the best proximity pair, whenever X i = Y i for each i ∈ I, thenx is actually the fixed point for the multifunction T = Π i∈I T i , i.e.,x ∈ T (x). Still there have been a number of generalized theorems on the existence of best proximity pairs which can be regarded as the optimal forms of Theorem A by several authors, e.g., see [2, 12, 19, 20, 23] .
Let X be a non-empty subset of a normed linear space E, and consider the metric projection map P X : E → 2 X defined by for each z ∈ E,
Then, it is well-known that if X is non-empty compact and convex, then P X (x) is a non-empty compact and convex subset of X, and the multifunction P X is upper semicontinuous in X. For the properties of the metric projection, see [18] [19] [20] . Next, we recall the following definition due to Kim and Lee which generalizes the concavity condition: Definition 1 ( [11] ). Let X be a non-empty topological space, Y an arbitrary set. Then f : X × Y → R is called C-concave on X if for every n ≥ 2, whenever n points x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X are arbitrarily given, there exists a continuous function
, and for all y ∈ Y . Remark. As remarked in [11] , the concavity clearly implies the C-concavity by letting φ n (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) := λ 1 x 1 +· · ·+λ n x n , whenever x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X are given; however, we do not know the implications between the quasi-concavity and the C-concavity.
Also recall that a topological space X is said to have the fixed point property (or is a fixed point space) [5] if every continuous mapping f : X → X has a fixed point in X. Clearly this property is topologically invariant, and note that the product of two fixed point spaces need not be a fixed point space. In contrast with finite products, an infinite product of non-empty compact fixed point spaces will be a fixed point space whenever every finite product of those spaces is a fixed point space, e.g. see [5, p.174] .
A multifunction T : X → 2 Y from a topological space X to a Hausdorff topological vector space Y is said to be a Kakutani multifunction [13] if the following conditions are satisfied:
Y is said to be a Kakutani factorizable multifunction [13] if it can be expressed as a composition of finitely many Kakutani multifunctions, i.e., S = T 1 • T 2 • · · · • T n , and each T i is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction.
Existence of best proximity pairs
The following Lassonde fixed point theorem for Kakutani factorizable multifunctions is a generalization of the well-known Fan-Glicksberg's fixed point theorem, and it is essential in proving the existence of best proximity pairs:
Theorem 1 ([13]). If X is a non-empty compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space, then any Kakutani factorizable multifunction T : X → 2
X has a fixed point, i.e., there exists a pointx ∈ X such thatx ∈ T (x). Now we will prove a new existence theorem for the best proximity pairs as follow:
Theorem 2. Let I be an (possibly infinite) index set and for each i ∈ I, let X i and Y i be non-empty compact and convex subsets of a normed linear space E, and let
Yi be an upper semicontinuous multifunction in X such that A i (x) is a non-empty closed and convex subset of Y i for each x ∈ X. Assume that for each i ∈ I, 
Then we can see that
j || → 0 and ||y n k −ỹ|| → 0, and ||x
is a non-empty closed and convex subset of Y = Π i∈I Y i . Also, it is known that for each i ∈ I, the metric projection map
is a non-empty compact and convex subset of X i for each z ∈ E (e.g., see [18, 24] ).
For each i ∈ I, we now define a multifunction
Then, by the assumptions, each A i (x) is non-empty compact and convex in Y o i , and A i is upper semicontinuous in X.
Finally, we introduce two multifunctions
and
Since A i and P X i are upper semicontinuous with compact and convex values for each i ∈ I, by Lemma 3 in [6] , A and P X are both upper semicontinuous such that each A (x) is non-empty compact and convex in Y o , and each P X (y) is non-empty compact and convex in X. Hence, A and P X are Kakutani multifunctions so that the composition map P X • A : X → 2 X is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction. Therefore, by Theorem 1, there exists a fixed pointx = (
for each i ∈ I. Therefore, for each i ∈ I, we have
Remarks. (i) The assumptions of Theorem 2 is different from those of Theorem 1 and 2 in [12] , and the conclusions have slight different forms. However, Theorem 2 can be regarded as an infinite generalization of Theorem 1 and 2 in [12] .
(
In those cases, the conclusion means thatx is a fixed point for Π i∈I A i , which implies the Bohnenblust-Karlin fixed point theorem [5] .
(iii) When |I| = 1, Theorem 2 generalizes Theorem 3.4 of SrinivasanVeeramani [24] by relaxing the condition "A(
Next we give a simple example which is suitable for Theorem 2, but the previous theorems due to Srinivasan-Veeramani [23, 24] , Kim-Lee [12] and others can not be applied:
2 with the Euclidean metric d, and for each 1 = 1, 2, let Yi be a multifunction defined by for each ((
Then, it is clear that each A i ((x 1 , 0), (x 2 , 0)) is a non-empty closed and convex subset of Y i . Also, it is easy to see that A i is upper semicontinuous in X. Then, for each (( 0) ) ∈ X, and X = X 1 × X 2 is a product set so that the theorems due to Srinivasan-Veeramani [23, 24] , KimLee [12] can not be applied. However, all the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are satisfied so that there exists a pointx = ((1, 0), (1, 0)) ∈ X of best proximity pairs such that d ((1, 0) ,
Existence of Nash equilibrium pairs
We first recall the equilibrium concept in the game theory due to Nash [15] . Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players. A non-cooperative Nash game (or n-person game) Γ = (X i ; f i ) i∈I of normal form is an ordered 2n-tuple (X 1 , . . . , X n ; f 1 , . . . , f n ), where for each player i ∈ I, the non-empty set X i is the player's pure strategy space, and f i : X = Π n i=1 X i → R is the player's payoff function. The set X, joint strategy space, is the Cartesian product of the individual strategy sets, and an element of X i is called a strategy. A strategy n-tuple (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium for Γ if the following system of inequalities holds: for each i = 1, . . . , n,
This pioneering concept on the existence of equilibrium for a non-cooperative n-person game was established by Nash in 1951, and is regraded as the basic result in equilibrium theories. Here it should be noted that it is possible to generalize that the set of players I may be infinite in the model of a game.
In recent papers [23, 24] , Srinivasan and Veeramani considered a general economic situation which is motivated to introduce the equilibrium pair concept in a constrained generalized games as follow. Suppose that goods are manufactured and sold in different locations. Each location (or player) can be a manufacturing as well as selling unit. It is agreed that the ultimate place where the goods get sold would be determining the payoff for the goods. Let there be n such locations. For each location, two strategies X i and Y i are associated, one to that of manufacturing unit and other to that of selling unit. Knowing the manufacturing strategy xî ∈ Xî := Π j∈I\{i} X j of all other locations, the choice of selling strategy at the ith location is restricted to
Y i → R at the ith location be given such that f i is the real-valued function at the given strategy y ∈ Y which can maximize the payoff associated with the ith location. In fact, the preferred strategies are strongly dependent to the consumer's behavior at the ith location. Under those settings, they investigated the system of multifunctions A i : X → 2
and f i : Y → R for each i ∈ I. Moreover, the cost involved in the transportation of goods to different places should also be taken into account. In fact, the transporting cost from x i to A i (x) can be considered as d(x i , A i (x)), and so it is very reasonable that its payoff function f i (y i , yî) on A i (x) can have a maximum whenever d(x i , A i (x)) has a minimum value d(X i , Y i ). In these situations, one can not expect an equilibrium for the Nash game of normal form by applying the previous results in [3, 4, 9, 11, [14] [15] [16] [17] because the strategy sets X i and Y i may be different in general.
In [23, 24] , as applications of their best proximity theorems, Srinivasan and Veeramani proved existence theorems of equilibrium pair for constrained generalized games by using the conditions (A) and (B), respectively. And, as remarked, the condition (c) of Definition 4.3 in [23] has less economic information for constrained generalized games. This is the motivation of our equilibrium pair concept for a generalized Nash games, and also we shall prove an existence theorem of equilibrium pair for constrained generalized games without assuming the conditions (A) in [24] nor (B) in [23] .
In this section, as an application of our best proximity pair theorem (Theorem 2), we shall prove an existence theorem of equilibrium pair for a generalized Nash games. Now we will introduce a new concept of equilibrium pairs in generalized Nash games as follows: Definition 2. Let I be a finite or an infinite set of players or locations. For each i ∈ I, let X i be a non-empty set of manufacturing commodities, and Y i be a non-empty set of selling commodities. A non-cooperative generalized Nash
, and
In particular, when I = {1, . . . , n}, we may call Γ a generalized n-person game of normal form. [24] have reasonable economic meanings in their settings, and it should be noted that our condition is related with the Definition 4.3 in [24] as
Remarks. (i) The transporting cost conditions ||x −
(ii) When X i = Y i and A i (x) = X i for each i ∈ I and x ∈ X in Definition 2, then the Nash equilibrium pair can be reduced to the standard definitions of equilibrium in the game theory due to Nash [14, 15] , Debreu [4] or Friedman [9] , and so the Nash game Γ = (X i , ; f i ) i∈I can be considered as a subgame of the generalized Nash game Γ = (X i , Y i ; A i , f i ) i∈I of normal form. For more economic meanings and interpretations, see [3, 9, [14] [15] [16] [17] .
In [17] , in order to obtain a Nash equilibrium for a game Γ, Nikaido and Isoda define the total sum of payoff functions H : X × X → R associated with the non-cooperative game Γ = (X i , ; f i ) i∈I , as follows:
Here we note that if for each i ∈ I, the function y i → f i (y i , xî) is concave as in Theorem B, then the function x → H(x, y) is concave; and so it is C-concave.
As mentioned before, we can generalize the total sum of payoff functions for the infinite generalized Nash game Γ. For this, we shall need the following. Let I be an infinite set of players, and let Γ = (X i , Y i ; A i , f i ) i∈I be a noncooperative generalized Nash game of normal form. For each i ∈ I, f i : Y i × Yî → R is said to be unconditionally summable if for each z i ∈ Y i and yî ∈ Yî, any rearrangement j∈I f j (z j , yĵ) of the infinite sum i∈I f i (z i , yî) converges to the same real value. Note that if Γ = (X i ; f i ) i∈I is a finite Nash game, then each f i is automatically unconditionally summable.
Using the unconditionally summablity, let us define the total sum of payoff functions H : Y × Y → R associated with the infinite generalized Nash game Γ = (X i , Y i ; A i , f i ) i∈I as follows:
The following is essential in proving the existence of generalized Nash equilibrium: Lemma 1. Let I be an infinite set of players and let Γ = (X i ; f i ) i∈I be a noncooperative Nash game of normal form where f i is unconditionally summable for each i ∈ I. If there exists a pointx ∈ X = Π i∈I X i with H(x,x) ≥ H(x,x) for any x ∈ X, thenx is a Nash equilibrium for Γ.
Proof. For each i ∈ I and for any
so thatx is a Nash equilibrium.
We shall need the following which is an infinite generalization of Theorem 1 in [11] where their proof can be worked without any changes: Lemma 2 ([11]). Let I be an infinite set of players, and let Γ = (X i ; f i ) i∈I be a non-cooperative Nash game of normal form. For each i ∈ I, f i : X i ×Xî → R is unconditionally summable and satisfies the following:
(i) the set X = X i × Xî is non-empty compact and has the fixed-point property;
(ii) the function H(x, y) is continuous on X × X; (iii) the function x → H(x, y) is C-concave on X. Then Γ has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Remark. As remarked in [11] , Lemma 2 generalizes the previous equilibrium existence theorems due to Nash [17] and Nikaido and Isoda [16] in several aspects.
As an application of Theorem 2, we will prove the existence of Nash equilibrium pairs for a generalized Nash game with infinite set of players as follows: 
Proof. For each i ∈ I, since A i satisfies the whole assumptions of Theorem 2, there exists a pointx = (x i ) i∈I ∈ X of best proximity pairs, i.e., for each i ∈ I,
. It remains to show the existence of Nash equilibrium on the constraint set Π i∈I A i (x). Since A i (x) is a non-empty closed convex subset of Y i , we can now restrict the generalized Nash game Γ = (X i , Y i ; A i , f i ) i∈I to the Nash subgame Γ = (A i (x); f i ) i∈I , and also restrict the domain of the total sum of payoff functions H on A × A where A := Π i∈I A i (x). Then the whole assumptions of Lemma 2 are satisfied so that there exists a Nash equilibrium (ȳ i ) i∈I ∈ Π i∈I A i (x) for the Nash subgame Γ = (A i (x); f i ) i∈I , i.e., for each i ∈ I,
Therefore, we can obtain an equilibrium pair (x,ȳ) = (x i ) i∈I , (ȳ i ) i∈I ∈ X × A ⊆ X × Y for the generalized Nash game Γ. This completes the proof.
Remark. In Theorem 3, we can relax the assumptions (3) and (4) into the following weaker assumptions without affecting the conclusion: (3 ) the total sum of payoff functions
In Theorem 3, when X i = Y i and A i (x) = X i for each i ∈ I and for all x ∈ X where each X i is assumed to be contained in the Euclidean space R n , we can obtain the infinite generalization of the existence of Nash equilibrium (i.e., Theorem B):
Finally, we shall give an example of a generalized 2-person game which is suitable for Theorem 4, but the previous equilibrium existence theorems in [14-17, 23, 24] can not be applied: , 1) is not open in X for each (a, 1) ∈ Y so that the previous theorems due to Debreu [4] , Nash [14, 15] , Kim-Lee [11, 12] , Srinivasan-Veeramani [24] can not be applied in this model. It is easy to see that since each f i is continuous and concave, the assumptions (3)(i) and (ii) of Theorem 4 are satisfied so that there exists a Nash equilibrium pair (x,ȳ) ∈ X × Y for Γ, that is, we can obtain that x = (1, 0), (1, 0) ,ȳ = (1, 1), (1, 1) is the desired Nash equilibrium pair for the generalized 2-person game Γ. In fact, for each i = 1, 2, we havē 
